



**ANNUAL REPORT  
ALASKA REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAM (ARRT)  
CY 2010**

**Executive Summary**

**Period of Report: 15 Dec 2009 to 31 Jan 2011.**

**I. Challenges-**

- a. Attempting to maintain adequate regional readiness while supporting an out of area Spill of National Significance, Deepwater Horizon (DWH).
- b. Recommendations for dispersant related policy changes that have come from EPA leadership and NRT have required turnaround times that do not allow for robust input from natural resource trustees or tribes.
- c. Lack of long-term Coast Guard continuity; in both Alaska RRT leadership and technical expert roles inhibits progress.

**II. Lessons Learned-**

- a. Informational Alaska RRT conference calls during DWH response were a useful vehicle for sharing information and concerns.
- b. There is an overall lack of standardized process or understanding of engagement between EPA and USCG for ESF-10 responses under NRF declared disasters.

**III. Best Practices-** An institutionalized process that was derived from a lesson learned and can be applied to other situations or incidents.

- a. The State of Alaska and USCG established a website to provide information on how Alaska government agencies, Federal agencies with operations in Alaska and Alaska businesses are providing assistance to the Deepwater Horizon Response. The website reduced duplication of effort between all agencies and provided an up to date status on resources leaving the state. The website can be viewed at the following address:  
<http://dec.alaska.gov/spar/deepwater-horizon-resources/index.htm>



**Period of Report: 15 Dec 2009 to 31 Jan 2011.**

## **I. MAJOR ACTIVITIES**

### **A. Major/Noteworthy Response Activities:**

Tug PATHFINDER Grounding: On December 23, 2009, the Tug PATHFINDER, owned and operated by Crowley Maritime grounded on the infamous Bligh Reef with an estimated 123,000 gallons of diesel fuel onboard. The vessel breached three of its fuel tanks containing approximately 24,000 gallons of diesel fuel of which approximately 6,000 gallons were discharged. The tug was returning from an ice scouting mission and the cause of the incident remains under investigation. The Ship Escort Response Vessel System (SERVS) (the Oil Spill Response Organization (OSRO) for Prince William Sound (PWS)) responded and commenced skimming operations in the area of heavy sheening. The FOSC held one Alaska RRT briefing, but did not request an incident specific activation. Additional information is online at the Unified Command's website:

[http://dec.alaska.gov/spar/perp/response/sum\\_fy10/091223201/091223201\\_index.htm](http://dec.alaska.gov/spar/perp/response/sum_fy10/091223201/091223201_index.htm)

Adak Petroleum Diesel Spill: On January 11, 2010, Adak Petroleum overfilled its underground 114,000-barrel (4.8 million gallons) diesel storage tank (N-7) during a routine transfer from the tank ship AL AMERAT. Approximately 3,400 barrels (143,800 gallons) of diesel fuel discharged from tank N-7 into secondary containment surrounding the tank, from which valves were open to a drainage system leading to Helmet Creek. The fuel overwhelmed the system's oil/water separator, spilling into Helmet Creek and the small boat harbor at its terminus in Sweeper Cove. The cleanup was complicated. The site is a National Historic Landmark and unexploded ordnance was discovered in upper Helmet Creek. The ordnance was removed on February 6 by U.S. Army explosives experts. Approximately 147 barrels (6174 gallons) were recovered and approximately 465 bags of oily solid waste (sorbent boom and pads) were burned using portable incinerators. The FOSC held two Alaska RRT briefings, but did not request an incident specific activation. Additional information is online at the Unified Command's website:

[http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/response/sum\\_fy10/100111201/100111201\\_index.htm](http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/response/sum_fy10/100111201/100111201_index.htm)

M/V PRINCESS KATHLEEN Submerged Wreck: On September 2, 1952, this cruise liner sank after grounding at Point Lena in heavy fog. The vessel sank with what was thought to contain approximately 155,000 gallons of bunker C heavy fuel oil (No 6 fuel oil). The vessel produced small oil sheens sporadically over the years increasing to about once a month. On Thursday, February 11, 2010 Coast Guard Sector Juneau responded to the report of an oil sheen in the vicinity of Lena Point. Sector Juneau investigators identified the most likely source of the sheen as the M/V PRINCESS KATHLEEN. On February 12<sup>th</sup>, the FOSC opened the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund to conduct a remote survey of the



sunken vessel to determine the vessel's conditions after more than 50 years underwater. Between February 2010 and September 10, 2010 Sector Juneau conducted removal operations of approximately 130,000 gallons of heavy fuel oil at a cost of over \$15 million dollars. Additional information is online at the Unified Command's website:  
[http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/response/sum\\_fy10/100216101/100216101\\_index.htm](http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/response/sum_fy10/100216101/100216101_index.htm)

Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (APSC) Pump Station 9, Release to Secondary Containment: On May 25, 2010, during a scheduled test of a fire command system, the pump station experienced a power failure. Pump Station 9 sits just off the Richardson Highway, eight miles south of Delta Junction and approximately 110 miles southeast of Fairbanks. Alyeska Pipeline personnel switched to an uninterrupted power source "UPS" or "battery". The UPS system failed to close a valve allowing oil from the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) line to overfill Tank 190 discharging approximately 5000 bbls of crude oil into lined secondary containment. Given the sites location in relation to the Big Delta River and its tributaries the incident was deemed a threat to "navigable waters" during the initial response. An on-site investigation of the surrounding area and assessment of the secondary containment structure determined that there was essentially "no threat" to navigable waters of the United States. The incident was considered to be "non-jurisdictional" with the State of Alaska's Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) taking lead on governmental oversight of the response. EPA maintained a presence on scene for a couple of days to assist the lead agency. Additional information is online at the Unified Command's website:  
[http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/response/sum\\_fy10/100525301/100525301\\_index.htm](http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/response/sum_fy10/100525301/100525301_index.htm)

M/V GOLDEN SEAS loss of Main Propulsion: On December 3, 2010 the M/V GOLDEN SEAS suffered a casualty to its main engine turbo charger, lost propulsion and was adrift approximately 55 NM NW of Atka Island and the Aleutian Island chain (N52° 44' W176° 08'). The 738 ft bulk carrier was loaded with approximately 61,000 MT of canola seed and about 520,000 gallons of heavy fuel oil onboard. While the vessel had limited propulsion, it was unable to make any headway in 25ft seas and 45kt winds and was drifting toward Atka Island at 2.4kts with an estimated landfall within 30 hours. The FOSC, Sector Anchorage, established a Unified Command and requested that the Alaska RRT standup an incident specific activation to address potential impacts if the vessel grounded on Atka Island. The US Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fishers Service pointed-out areas of critical habitat on/around Atka Island. On December 4, 2010, the winds and seas subsided enough to allow the GOLDEN SEAS proceed away from Atka Island at a speed of approximately 3 kts. On December 5, 2010 the ocean tug TOR VIKING TWO rendezvoused with the vessel and towed it to Dutch Harbor, AK for repairs. Repairs to the vessel's turbocharger were completed on December 12 and approved by the Coast Guard.



Sea trials were conducted on December 13 and the GOLDEN SEAS subsequently departed Dutch Harbor bound for the United Arab Emirates (its original destination). Additional information is online at the Unified Command's website:

[http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/response/sum\\_fy11/101203201/101203201\\_index.htm](http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/response/sum_fy11/101203201/101203201_index.htm)

Univar Corrosion Inhibitor Spill Port of Anchorage: On November 15, 2010, the National Response Center (NRC) reported that about 2000 gallons of a petroleum based corrosion inhibitor, CORTRON RU-276, spilled from a 20,000 gallon rail car at the UNIVAR facility on East 100th Avenue in Anchorage. A call to the Branch Operations Manager revealed that a valve was left open on top of the rail car during bottom loading. Most of the product was reportedly to be contained within the lined rail ballast. An EPA Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) from the Alaska Field Office was deployed to the site to verify that drainage from the facility would not travel off-site. Clean up was conducted under the auspices of ADEC.

Post Road Drum Site: On November 8, 2010, EPA OSC Bob Whittier was notified by a U.S. EPA Region 10 Criminal Investigation Division Special Agent concerning the existence of several abandoned drums located on an industrial property at 200 Post Road in Anchorage, Alaska. Upwards of 280 drums, believed to contain flammable paint wastes, were found in various states of damage and corrosion. Many of the drums were observed to be stacked in a precarious manner, bulging, and releasing semi-viscous liquids. The drums allegedly originated from a defunct pavement markings company. On December 14, 2010, FOSC Bob Whittier and five Superfund Technical Assessment and Response Team (START) personnel, mobilized to the site to document, assess, and sample the contents of the drums. On site "hazard characterization tests" were limited due to the dark arctic conditions. Eight samples were collected from a group of representative drums and analyzed for pH, flash point, VOC's SVOC's and metals. Results are pending and will be provided in the next report.

Other Response Activities: Overall 19 response summaries were completed and posted on the State of Alaska website for other significant spills. A complete list of all response activities is online at the Unified Command's website:

[http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/response/sr\\_active.htm](http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/response/sr_active.htm) (under Active Response and FY10/11).

## **B. Alaska RRT Meetings/Incident Specific Activation:**

Meeting: Administration Session – January 26, 2010 in Juneau: USCG-coordinated; 21 persons attended; 4 participated via phonecon. 9 of 14 ARRT member agencies attended. The morning activities included a review and finalization of the draft Alaska RRT Charter and the afternoon session led to final changes to Change 3 to the Unified Plan. Both documents were completed and forwarded to the Alaska RRT for approval on January 27, 2010.



Meeting: Semi-annual Public Session – January 27, 2010 in Juneau: USCG-coordinated; 34 persons attended; 2 Alaska RRT members participated via phone. 11 of 14 Alaska RRT member agencies attended. Special presentation given on the following topics: USCG Tribal Engagement; USCG utilizing tribal engagement instead of tribal consultation because many tribes do not have adequate resources to consult with the federal government. Both the Alaska RRT Charter and Change 3 to the Unified Plan were approved by the Alaska RRT.

Activation: The Alaska RRT was active four times in CY 2010. See major activities above for specifics.

Meeting: Administration Session – 27 July, 2010 in Anchorage: EPA coordinated. 28 persons attended. 10 of 14 Alaska RRT member agencies attended. This working session addressed concerns of an Alaska RRT member agency (DOI) concerning their comments to the In-situ Burn Guidelines approved in Jan 2008 and formally approved in Jan 2010. In addition the USCG led a table top discussion regarding the potential use of dispersants during an incident.

Meeting: Semi-annual Public Session – 28 July, 2010 in Anchorage: EPA coordinated. 61 persons attended. 10 of 14 Alaska RRT member agencies attended. The Alaska RRT received presentations by the USCG on the integration of the NRT & RRTs during the Deepwater Horizon Response Command Structure; FOSC Sector Juneau, on lessons learned during the response to the submerged wreck PRINCESS KATHLEEN; Industry; Ocean Imaging Corporation, on lessons learned from Deepwater Horizon on Aerial Thickness Mapping System Development and response and Shell Oil Company on Arctic Oil Spill Research Under the Joint Industry Program.

### **C. Committee and Working Group Updates:**

Science and Technology Committee (STC): The Science and Technology Committee (STC) Tri-Chairs saw continued progress of its Dispersant Working Group (DWG) toward a proposal to revise the Dispersant Use Application and Guidelines of the Unified Plan (RCP). The Deepwater Horizon spill brought much greater interest in the deliberations of the DWG and, consequently, greater effort for the STC Tri-Chairs. The DWG is due to report-out on its proposed revision of the guidelines in the weeks ahead. Turnover of all three Tri-Chairs (USCG, EPA, State) also occurred, slowing progress a bit toward the end of CY10. Revisions to the RCP have been included in the ARRT's Biennial Work Plan for Calendar Year 2011-2012.

Statewide (HazMat) Response WG: ADEC-coordinated. The work group continued to meet on a quarterly basis during the calendar year. A Statewide Hazmat Team deployment



exercise was also held in April 2010 in conjunction with the Alaska Shield exercise. ADEC also coordinated an ammonia training course held in Kenai in May 2010. Work group members attended the FBI Comprehensive Integrated Training and Exercise Conference held in Anchorage during November 2010. Additional information is online at the DEC/SPAR website: <http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/hazmat.htm>.

## II. GENERAL PREPAREDNESS AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING

### A. Training:

EPA sponsored 8 hour Hazardous Operations refresher and 16 hour Oil Spill Course (April 2010): Approximately 30 local responders in Port Heiden on the Alaska Peninsula attended. The training primarily focused on containment and recovery techniques during an oil discharge event.

General overview of the Incident Command System (ICS) (February 2010): EPA, with the assistance of START, conducted a session at the Alaska Forum on the Environment.

ALOHA-MARPLOT and CAMEO courses (November 2010): EPA sponsored. Training held for Anchorage Fire Department and Statewide Hazmat Team members.

### B. Exercises/Workshops:

North Slope Mutual Aid Drill (August 2010): This field deployment exercise was sponsored by Alyeska Pipeline Service Company. EPA and ADEC participated in the planning and development of this exercise in coordination with the Alyeska Pipeline Services Company. The scenario simulated a release of 120 barrels (bbls) of Alaska North Slope Crude (ANSC) originating from TAPS in the general vicinity of Pipeline Milepost (PLMP) 126 in the Toolik/Kuparuk River Contingency Area. The simulated release flowed into the Kuparuk River in the vicinity at a rate of 10 bbls of oil per hour (boph). The exercise included a field deployment of manpower and equipment emphasizing tactical deployment of response resources in the Kuparuk River located in the northern region of TAPS. The exercise began with a simulated aboveground oil release originating from TAPS in the general vicinity of PLMP 126. Manpower from Pump Station (PS) 1 and Galbraith Maintenance Base (PS04), ACS, and North Slope Spill Response Teams (NSSRT) were be deployed to the field. APSC's mobile command post (MCP) was also deployed to PS03 to assist with command and control of the incident.



EPA/USCG/Statewide Hazmat Team (April 2010): EPA assisted in both the planning and execution of the Alaska Shield Exercise. This was a one day exercise which included a simulated hazardous substance release in the Port of Anchorage from a freight train accident which required a Level A response.

National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) Exercises.

- TAPS Tanker Drill/Exercise/Industry Led PREP Exercise (June 2010): ADEC and Coast Guard coordinated. Table top focused with no equipment deployed. Exercise scenario included a collision between a Polar Tankers, Inc vessel and an unknown vessel resulting in a discharge of 100K bbls of crude oil in the Prince William Sound (PWS) shipping lanes. USCG ARRT coordinator simulated ARRT activation to discuss use of dispersants. Final After Action report is still pending release.
- PREP Government Initiated Unannounced Drills (GIUs). COTP initiated: zero (0) of ten (10) annual unannounced drills.
- PREP Equipment Deployments Exercise (April 2010): One (1) equipment deployment occurred throughout CGD17. Type listed below:
  - Alaska Aerial Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) Deployments in Kodiak, AK.

**C. Federal, State, and Local Planning and Coordination Efforts:**

Alaska Unified Plan. ADEC, Coast Guard and EPA coordinated, completed final approval and publication of change 3.

Alaska Subarea Contingency Plans (SCPs). ADEC, Coast Guard and EPA coordinated. Stated goal: complete two (2) of ten (10) Subarea Plan updates every year. Working Group (WG) completed and published Change-2 to the Kodiak SCP. Planning meetings held for the following SCPs Southeast Alaska, Bristol Bay, Northwest Arctic, North Slope and Western Alaska. The Northwest Arctic and North Slope subareas have the highest priority due to proposed offshore oil and gas development in these areas. In addition, updates to the SEAK SCP have started.



Potential Places of Refuge (PPOR) Guidelines.

- Southeast Alaska subarea: ADEC and Coast Guard coordinated. Project completed. Detailed information on the PPOR guidelines and process can be accessed at: <http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/index.htm> (under special projects).
- Northwest and North Slope subareas: PPOR development is now underway. Funding for these projects is through the federal Coastal Impact Assistance Program administered by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE).

Geographic Response Strategies (GRS): Further GRS development is also underway for the Northwest Arctic subarea. Funding for this project is through the federal Coastal Impact Assistance Program.

Emergency Towing Systems (ETS): ADEC is coordinating with the Coast Guard on the purchase and pre-staging of two additional ETS packages. One of the systems will be staged in Southeast Alaska, while the other system will be staged for rapid deployment at the NavSupSalv facility located on Fort Richardson. An exercise is also planned for the Southeast ETS package during the spring of 2011. Funding for this project is through the federal Coastal Impact Assistance Program.

**D. Major Best Practices from Responses, Trainings, Exercises/ Workshops and Other RRT Activities. N/A**

**III. PERSONNEL CHANGES/ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES**

<b>New Rep</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Departed Rep</b>
Chris Field	EPA Region 10; ARRT Co-chair (Seattle, WA)	02/01/2010	Carl Lautenberger
Calvin Terada	EPA Region 10; ARRT Alt-Co-chair (Seattle, Wa)	02/01/2010	Matt Carr
Mark Everett (CDR)	CGD17 (DX) USCG ARRT Alt-Co-chair (Juneau, AK)	08/01/2010	Rick Rodriguez (CDR)
Gary Folley	Alaska Department of Conservation (ADEC) State Representative	12/01/2010	Bob Mattson
Wally Moon	EPA Region 10; ARRT Alt-Co-chair (Seattle, Wa)	02/01/2011	Calvin Terada



New Rep	Organization	Date	Departed Rep
Cindy Sacks	(Pri), USDOT Regional Emerg. Transp. Rep. (RETREP) Region X - Alaska Office	08/01/2010	N/A
Linda Bender	(Alt) USDOT Regional Emerg. Transp. Rep. (RETREP) Region X - Alaska	08/01/2010	N/A
Diane Clark	(Pri) Dept of Energy Region 8 Regional Response Coordinator, Richland, WA	01/11/2011	Kathy Beecher
Major Michelle Gillaspie	(Alt) DOD Alaska Command, Anchorage, AK	12/01/2011	William Zagrocki

#### IV. ISSUES OR OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS REQUIRING NRT ATTENTION

**Issue:** DOI Pre-Approval rescission letter concerning use of dispersants dated: September 26, 2008. Still pends.

**Issue:** ARRT letter to NRT dated September 10, 2009 requesting the NRT re-evaluate the 1995 guidance containing recommended limits for short term exposure to particulate matter (PM) and potential impacts to safe distances in guidance for In Situ Burning as an alternative countermeasure. Still pends.

**Issue:** Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) 60-day Notice of Intent to Sue the USCG and EPA for Violations of the Endangered Species Act related to the Promulgation of the Unified Plan and the Preauthorization of Chemical Dispersant.